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On September 18, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals forthe Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court’s decision togrant summary judgment to the defendant Unocal
Corporation in the Doe v. Unocal lawsuit. The Ninth Circuit’s
decision, which allows the landmark case against the Cali-
fornia-based gas and oil giant to go forward, stands for the
important proposition that corporations can be held legally
accountable for aiding and abetting a foreign government’s
human rights abuses in violation of international law.  
In 1997, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California agreed to hear Doe v. Unocal. The law-
suit filed by Burmese
peasants alleging Uno-
cal’s legal responsibility
for human rights abuses,
including forced labor,
murder, and rape, com-
mitted by the Burmese
military on behalf of Uno-
cal’s Yadana gas pipeline
project. The decision in
Doe v. Unocal marked the
first time a U.S. court
asserted the jurisdictional
authority, granted under
the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA), to determine a
corporation’s liability for
human rights abuses in
violation of international
law in a foreign country.  
Three years after the
initial filing, the district
court found that the
plaintiffs had presented evidence that Unocal knew of and
benefited from the alleged human rights abuses. Despite
these findings, however, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’
case. The court reasoned that Unocal’s knowledge of and
deriving benefits from human rights violations were insuffi-
cient to establish that Unocal wanted these human rights vio-
lations to occur. Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision, allowing the
lawsuit against Unocal to proceed.
Background
A man is shot at by Burmese soldiers for fleeing forced
labor on the Yadana project. In retaliation for his flight,
the soldiers kick his wife and baby into a fire. The child
dies a few days later. Burmese soldiers assigned to the
pipeline rape women in villages along the route and sum-
marily execute villagers who are too weak to participate in
the forced labor program connected with the Yadana pro-
ject. These are only a few examples of the abuses connected
with Unocal’s Yadana project. 
In 1992, Unocal acquired an interest in the Yadana nat-
ural gas pipeline project, becoming a co-venturer with
France-based Total, S.A. (now Total-Fina-Elf) and the
Burmese military junta’s Myanmar Ministry for Oil and Gas
Enterprises (MOGE). Unocal decided to invest in Burma, and
work in tandem with the Burmese government, despite Uno-
cal’s knowledge of the junta’s notorious and well-deserved
reputation as one of the worst human rights violators in the
world. Unocal’s own consultants pointed out that “the gov-
ernment habitually makes use of forced labour to construct
roads” and that “in such circumstances Unocal and its part-
ners will have little freedom of manoeuvre.” A U.S. Depart-
ment of State report from the same year mirrors the assess-
ment of Unocal’s consultants in pointing out that the
Burmese military routinely conscripts forced laborers and
porters.
The project’s goal was to
exploit the Yadana natural gas
field located off Burma’s coast
in the Andaman Sea by
extracting gas from the under-
water field and transporting it
via a pipeline from Burma into
Thailand. The portion of the
pipeline in Burma is about 40
miles long, and extends from
the Burmese coast across Bur-
ma’s Tenasserim region to the
Thai-Burma border. The
Tenasserim region is a fragile
area of pristine forests inhab-
ited by indigenous ethnic
minority groups as well as
many endangered species. A
Yadana project contract made
MOGE responsible for pro-
viding security on the pipeline
project.
Future abuse in Burma was
particularly foreseeable at the time Unocal made its decision
to invest in the Yadana project as Unocal entered Burma
immediately following a 1988 military crackdown and an
election fiasco in 1990. In 1988, the Burmese military junta
violently repressed non-violent demonstrations calling for
democracy and human rights, in what is often referred to as
Burma’s Tiananmen Square. The uprising resulted in thou-
sands of deaths, and thousands of people were jailed with-
out trial. Following the crackdown, the military dictatorship
dubbed itself the “State Law and Order Restoration Coun-
cil” (SLORC, herein used to describe the Burmese govern-
ment and military and, at times, MOGE), renamed Burma
“Myanmar,” and instituted martial law.  
In 1990, SLORC bowed to citizens’ demands for multiparty
elections but refused to recognize the election results when
the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a convinc-
ing victory. SLORC further responded to the election results
by intimidating and placing under house arrest NLD lead-
ers, including 1991 Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi,
and placing some under arbitrary arrest and detention.
Since the election incident, Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD
leaders have requested that the international community not
invest in Burma in hopes of undermining the dictatorship’s
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unjust rule. In 1997, the Clinton administration responded
by imposing an embargo on new investments in Burma.
Because the embargo did not have retroactive effect, how-
ever, the biggest U.S. investor in Burma, Unocal, was not
forced to leave. 
Due to Unocal’s knowledge of past human rights abuse
in Burma, the alleged human rights abuses that came with
the Yadana pipeline project were completely foreseeable. Pur-
suant to its contract with Unocal and Total, MOGE drastically
increased the SLORC military presence along the pipeline
route. Not surprisingly, with the increased military presence
came a corresponding increase in human rights abuses.
SLORC used its well established modus operandi of human
rights abuse to provide not only pipeline security, but also to
forcibly relocate entire villages for the benefit of the con-
struction of the pipeline. In addition, SLORC’s use of forced
labor and portering to clear land for the pipeline and to
build pipeline infrastructure has been well documented. In the
process of using forced labor, forced portering, and forced relo-
cation to benefit the project, SLORC committed other human
rights abuses including rape, torture, and extrajudicial killing. 
To this day, Unocal is aware that
both state governments, including
the U.S. government, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations, such as
Amnesty International and Earth-
Rights International (ERI), con-
tinue to cite the Burmese military
dictatorship’s egregious human
rights violations. A 2001 U.S.
Department of State report cites
“the [Burmese] Government’s
extremely poor human rights
record and longstanding severe repression of its citizens,”
and reports that the junta continues to maintain repressive con-
trol over the country through intimidation, arbitrary arrests
and detentions, physical abuse, and other human rights
abuses. The report goes on to describe Burma’s security
forces’ “serious human rights abuses,” citing credible reports
of extrajudicial killing, rape, and torture, among others. The
State Department also reports that over 1,500 political prisoners
are being held in Burma. International organizations, includ-
ing the United Nations and the International Labor Organi-
zation (ILO), also continue to document and decry the human
rights situation in Burma. A 1998 ILO report found “abundant
evidence . . . showing the pervasive use of forced labour
imposed on the civilian population throughout Myanmar by
the authorities and the military.”
The Lawsuit’s History
In 1996, plaintiffs from Burma’s Tenasserim region
brought a lawsuit against Unocal and two top Unocal exec-
utives John Imle and Roger Beach (Unocal), Total, MOGE,
and SLORC for SLORC’s abusive behavior connected to the
Yadana pipeline project. ERI and others, including the Cen-
ter for Constitutional Rights, Hadsell & Stormer, and the Law
Offices of Paul Hoffman, filed the lawsuit on the plaintiffs’
behalf in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Cal-
ifornia. A similar lawsuit was filed by the International Labor
Rights Fund. The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive and
declaratory relief from the defendants for SLORC’s violations
of U.S. federal and state law.  
The plaintiffs claimed, in part, that Unocal was directly
and vicariously liable for SLORC’s human rights abuses in
violation of international law, connected to the pipeline
project, pursuant to the  ATCA. The ATCA grants U.S. fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States.” The plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants violated international laws prohibiting forced
labor, murder, and rape.
The Federal District Court’s Decision to Assert Jurisdiction
over the Claims against Unocal
Unocal responded to the plaintiffs’ complaint by filing a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In 1997, the district
court granted Unocal’s motion in part by dismissing the
plaintiffs’ lawsuit against MOGE and SLORC. In addition, the
court later dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against Total for
lack of personal jurisdiction. However, the court denied
Unocal’s motion to dismiss in part, holding that the lawsuit
could proceed against Unocal. The court’s decision marked
the first time a U.S. federal court held that it could find a pri-
vate U.S.-based corporation liable for violations of interna-
tional law committed abroad under the ATCA.  
The court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims
against MOGE and SLORC was
based on its determination that it
could not assert jurisdiction over
them as a foreign state’s agents or
instrumentalities under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA). In U.S. law, it is presumed
that foreign states, and their agents
and instrumentalities, are immune
from U.S. courts’ jurisdiction. The
only way that this presumption of
immunity can be rebutted, and
jurisdiction can be established, is if one of the limited excep-
tions delineated in the FSIA is met. Here, the court held that
MOGE’s and SLORC’s alleged activities did not fit into one
of the exceptions provided for under the FSIA. As a result,
the court refused to rebut the presumption that MOGE and
SLORC were immune from U.S. courts’ jurisdiction, and dis-
missed the plaintiffs’ case against them.  
At the same time, the court rejected Unocal’s argument
that the court should refuse jurisdiction over the defen-
dants under the act of state doctrine. The act of state doc-
trine is a discretionary, judicially made doctrine (unlike the
FSIA which is a statute) that directs U.S. courts to consider
international comity and U.S. domestic separation of pow-
ers issues when deciding whether or not to hear a particu-
lar lawsuit. The doctrine suggests that courts ought to decline
jurisdiction when hearing a case that would require a U.S.
court to judge the acts of another sovereign state’s govern-
ment or require the U.S. judicial branch to interfere with
responsibilities delegated to the other branches of govern-
ment. Here, the court determined that comity and separa-
tion of powers considerations did not compel the court to
decline jurisdiction over the case because of the U.S. gov-
ernment’s overall condemnation of the Burmese regime.
Most notably at this stage, the court rejected Unocal’s
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ ATCA claims. Unocal’s
motion contended that only states can violate international
law and that, by definition, the ATCA failed to provide the
continued on next page
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court with subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’
claims against a private, non-state actor like Unocal. The court
rejected Unocal’s argument, holding that state actors as
well as states can violate international law, and that the state
action requirement could be met if the plaintiffs established
that Unocal was directly or vicariously liable for SLORC’s
international law violations.  
Additionally, the court found that at least the plaintiffs’
forced labor were of the kind that did not require any state
action under international law. Specifically, the court noted that
the plaintiffs’ forced labor claims amounted to allegations of
slavery, one of a limited number of egregious international law
violations for which non-state actors can be held liable under
the ATCA. Therefore, the district court asserted subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims by determining that
the plaintiffs had pled sufficient facts to state a claim against
Unocal pursuant to the ATCA.
The Federal District Court’s Decision to Grant Unocal’s
Summary Judgment Motion
Following discovery, Unocal filed a motion for summary
judgment. At this stage, Unocal argued before a different
judge of the same court that the plaintiffs had failed to pre-
sent evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact
such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in
the plaintiffs’ favor. At the end of August 2000, the district
court granted Unocal’s motion for summary judgment as to
the plaintiffs’ federal claims and dismissed the plaintiffs’
state law claims without prejudice.
Regarding the plaintiffs’ ATCA claims requiring state
action, namely the murder, rape, and torture claims, the court
found that the plaintiffs presented evidence demonstrating
that before joining the Pro-
ject, Unocal knew that the mil-
itary had a record of commit-
ting human rights abuses; that
the Project hired the military
to provide security for the Pro-
ject, a military that forced vil-
lagers to work and entire vil-
lages to relocate for the
benefit of the Project; that the
military, while forcing villagers
to work and relocate, com-
mitted numerous acts of vio-
lence; and that Unocal knew
or should have known that the
military did commit, was com-
mitting, and would continue
to commit these tortious acts. 
Despite these findings, the
court nonetheless dismissed
plaintiffs’ claims by holding
that the claims failed as a mat-
ter of law because the plaintiffs
could neither show that Uno-
cal engaged in state action nor controlled SLORC. In terms
of Unocal’s engagement, the court stated that the plaintiffs
presented no evidence that Unocal “participated in or influ-
enced” SLORC’s unlawful acts or “conspired” with SLORC
to commit the alleged human rights abuse.  The court also
held that the plaintiffs presented no evidence that Unocal
“controlled” SLORC’s decision to commit the alleged human
rights abuses. Therefore, the court decided that Unocal’s
knowledge of and benefiting from SLORC’s unlawful con-
duct was not enough to hold Unocal potentially liable for the
plaintiffs’ ATCA claims requiring state action.
The district court held that the plaintiffs’ forced labor
claims, the ATCA claims not requiring state action, failed as
a matter of law as well. In so ruling, the court found that
Unocal’s knowledge of and acceptance of benefits from
SLORC’s forced labor practices surrounding the pipeline pro-
ject were not sufficient, but that proof of Unocal’s “active par-
ticipation in the unlawful conduct” was required to impose
liability on the corporation. The court took the “active par-
ticipation” standard from the Nuremberg Trials, and
explained its overall position by stating that
The evidence does suggest that Unocal knew that
forced labor was being utilized and that the Joint Ven-
turers benefitted from the practice. However, because
such a showing is insufficient to establish liability under
international law, Plaintiffs’ claim against Unocal for
forced labor under the Alien Tort Claims Act fails as
a matter of law.
The plaintiffs appealed the decision regarding the ATCA and
other federal law claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and filed the state law claims, which had been dis-
missed without prejudice, in a California state court. The law-
suit filed in California state court survived summary judgment
and is set to go to trial in February 2003. The appeal was argued
before a panel of Ninth Circuit judges in December 2001.
The Ninth Circuit’s Decision to Reverse the District Court’s
ATCA Ruling
On September 18, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (Court) reversed the district court’s grant of
Unocal’s summary judg-
ment motion on the
plaintiffs’ ATCA claims
for forced labor, murder,
and rape. Specifically, the
Court found that Unocal
may be liable for aiding
and abetting SLORC’s







labor claims, the Court
agreed with the district
court’s decision on Uno-
cal’s motion to dismiss
that the plaintiffs did not
have to demonstrate Uno-
cal was a state actor but
could hold Unocal indi-
vidually liable for SLORC’s violations under international law.
In so doing, the Court identified forced labor as one of the
limited number of international law violations not requiring
state action by equating forced labor with “a modern variant
of slavery.” The Court disagreed, however, with the district
court’s ruling on summary judgment that the plaintiffs were
continued on next page
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required to show that Unocal’s conduct rose to the level of
“active participation” in SLORC’s forced labor practices.
The Court explained that the district court mistakenly bor-
rowed the “active participation” standard from the Nurem-
berg Trials. The Court pointed out that in Nuremberg the
“active participation” standard was utilized to overcome the
German industrialist defendants’ necessity defense. The
necessity defense is applicable when “it is shown that the act
charged was done to avoid an evil both serious and irrepara-
ble; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and
that the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil.” Here,
the Court found that Unocal did not and could not invoke
the necessity defense.  Unlike the industrialists under the Nazi
regime, Unocal was under no com-
pulsion to do business with the
Burmese military. As such, deprived
of the context required to invoke
the necessity defense, the Court
held that the district court erred by
citing Unocal’s “active participa-
tion” in SLORC’s forced labor activ-
ities as the relevant standard.  
The Court went on to say that,
even if “active participation” had
been the correct standard, the dis-
trict court misapplied the standard considering the evidence
presented by the plaintiffs. The Court determined that the
plaintiffs had presented evidence sufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether or not Unocal had
“actively participated” in SLORC’s forced labor practices. The
Court explained that the evidence showed that Unocal
resembled the defendants in the Krupp case before the
Nuremberg Tribunal. In Krupp, the Tribunal held that the
defendants met the “active participation” standard because
they “well knew that any expansion [of their business] would
require the employment of forced labor.”  Here, the Court
stated that there was evidence that Unocal knew that expand-
ing its business in Burma would require forced labor. The
evidence cited by the Court includes Unocal President John
Imle’s statement that “if forced labor goes hand in glove with
the military yes, there will be more forced labor [as a result
of SLORC’s protecting the pipeline].” 
Regarding the murder and rape claims, the Court held
that the District Court erred in requiring the plaintiffs to meet
the state action requirement and show that Unocal “con-
trolled” SLORC’s decision to commit alleged murder and
rape. The Court held that there is no state action require-
ment where the alleged international law violations were com-
mitted in the context of perpetrating crimes that do not
require state action, such as slavery. The Court reasoned that,
because the plaintiffs’ allegations of murder and rape
allegedly “occurred in furtherance of a forced labor pro-
gram,” and because forced labor is “a modern variant of slav-
ery,” the plaintiffs need not meet the state action requirement
for their murder and rape claims. Therefore, as with the
forced labor claims, the Court found that Unocal may be held
individually liable, as a non-state actor, for SLORC’s alleged
murder and rape connected to the project.
It follows, and the Court so held, that the district court
erred in requiring the plaintiffs to establish proximate cause
by showing that Unocal “controlled” SLORC’s alleged deci-
sion to murder and rape the plaintiffs. The Court found that,
because no showing of state action is required, the plaintiffs
need show only foreseeability to establish the requisite prox-
imate cause. Using the same reasoning, the Court concluded
that the same liability standard should be used when assess-
ing all of the plaintiffs’ forced labor, murder, and rape
claims.
The Ninth Circuit’s Aiding and Abetting Liability Standard
The Court determined that aiding and abetting is the
appropriate liability standard, and that under this standard
the plaintiffs had established that Unocal may be liable for
SLORC’s violations of international law under the ATCA. The
Court held that the aiding and abetting standard under the
ATCA is “knowing and practical assistance or encouragement
that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime.” The aiding and abetting standard that the Court
applied was based in international law.  
Given the record in Doe v. Uno-
cal, the Court determined that
international law was the appro-
priate source for the applicable
aiding and abetting liability stan-
dard. The Court looked specifi-
cally to recent decisions of the
International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda to help determine the
current aiding and abetting stan-
dard to be used under the ATCA.
The Court found useful the aiding and abetting standard
defined in the Prosecutor v. Furundvzija case before the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, describing it as “knowing practical assis-
tance, encouragement, or moral support which has a sub-
stantial effect on the perpetration of a crime.” The Court also
looked to the aiding and abetting standard in the U.S.
domestic Restatement (Second) of Torts: “For harm result-
ing to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the other’s
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself.” The Court ultimately applied a “slightly modified
Furundvzija standard.” By taking out the “moral support” por-
tion of the Furundvzija rule, the Court was left with “knowing
and practical assistance or encouragement that has a sub-
stantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.” The Court
explained that this aiding and abetting standard was appro-
priate because it was rooted in and consistent with the
Nuremberg precedent in the context where the necessity
defense was inapplicable.
Under this standard, the Court determined that the plain-
tiffs established genuine issues of material fact concerning Uno-
cal’s liability for aiding and abetting SLORC’s forced labor,
murder, and rape. The Court found that a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that Unocal’s alleged actions met
the aiding and abetting standard’s actus reus requirement
because the plaintiffs submitted evidence that Unocal provided
SLORC with “practical assistance or encouragement which had
a substantial effect on the perpetration” of the crimes of
forced labor, murder, and rape. The Court explained that
Unocal’s “practical assistance or encouragement” of SLORC’s
abuses was supported by evidence showing that Unocal may
have hired SLORC to provide pipeline security and build
pipeline infrastructure in exchange for money and food. The
Court’s assertion was also supported by evidence that Unocal
used photos, maps, and surveys to show SLORC where to
provide security and build infrastructure. In addition, the
The Court determined that aiding and
abetting is the appropriate liability
standard, and that under this standard the
plaintiffs had established that Unocal may
be liable for SLORC’s violations of
international law under the ATCA.
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Court held that the plaintiffs provided evidence showing that
Unocal’s alleged assistance had a “substantial effect” in
perpetrating the alleged abuses because the abuses “most
probably would not have occurred in the same way” if Uno-
cal had not hired and directed SLORC.    
Second, the Court held that a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Unocal’s actions met the mens rea require-
ment of the aiding and abetting standard because Unocal
knew or should have known that its actions would assist
SLORC in committing crimes. The Court based this finding
on the district court’s holding that the plaintiffs’ evidence
suggests that Unocal knew of and benefited from SLORC’s
human rights abuses connected with the project. 
It should be noted that the Court did not preclude other
theories of liability by choosing to apply an aiding and abet-
ting standard in Doe v. Unocal. The Court specifically stated
that the plaintiffs’ claims that Unocal is liable for SLORC’s
human rights abuses under other liability theories, like joint
venture, agency, negligence, and recklessness, may be viable
theories in this case and other ATCA cases. In fact, the con-
curring judge in the Ninth Circuit decision would have
reversed the district court’s summary judgment decision for
Unocal using the federal common law liability theories of
agency, joint venture, and reckless disregard.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit’s Doe v. Unocal decision is important for
a number of reasons. Specifically, the decision reaffirms the
important principle that forced labor is tantamount to slav-
ery. It also reaffirms the district court’s decision at the
motion to dismiss stage that corporations can be held liable
for violations of international law under the ATCA. Most
importantly, however, the decision sets out a well reasoned
liability standard that comports with well established prin-
ciples of law.
The recent Doe v. Unocal decision is in no way revolutionary
in that it simply applies legal standards, established since
Nuremberg, in a way that holds transnational corporations
accountable for their involvement in human rights abuses in
violation of international law. At the same time, the decision
does not go so far as to state that a corporation can be held
liable for a government’s abuses simply by doing business in
a country, as misinformed critics claim. The Ninth Circuit’s
aiding and abetting liability theory tempers the unreasonably
high “smoking-gun” liability standard that the district court
attempted to apply at the summary judgment stage. This
“smoking-gun” standard flew in the face of basic legal liability
concepts by making it necessary for Unocal subjectively to
want SLORC to commit human rights abuses.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is important because it
defines a standard for liability, based on well established
legal concepts and plain common sense, that puts transna-
tional corporations on notice that if a corporation knowingly
assists or encourages the perpetration of a crime, the com-
pany will be held responsible for its actions. 
*John Cheverie is the J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro public
service fellow at EarthRights International (ERI) and a 2003 J.D.
candidate at The George Washington University Law School.
ERI (www.earthrights.org) is co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Doe v.
Unocal.
and facilities for the rehabilitation of delinquent minors
who require care, guidance and control.”  In Illinois, the pur-
pose clause for delinquency proceedings includes the devel-
opment of educational, vocational, social, emotional and
basic life skills [to] enable a minor to mature into a pro-
ductive member of society.” Meeting the purpose of reha-
bilitation requires that the juvenile detention system, both
structurally and substantively, recognize and address the
particular needs of the female population.
International Standards
Many human rights requirements relating to incarcerated
children are evaluated under international standards that do
not have the legal authority of treaties. They have, however,
been adopted by the UN General Assembly, providing a
certain level of moral force. Additionally, the United States
participated in their drafting and agreed on the necessity of
their adoption. International minimum standards on juve-
nile justice, through their emphasis on rehabilitation and the
best interests of the child, advocate for gender-specific pro-
gramming. Rule 26.4 of the Beijing Rules reads, “Young
female offenders placed in an institution deserve special
attention as to their personal needs and problems.” Fur-
ther, Point 28 of the UN Rules mandates that juvenile deten-
tion should only take place under conditions that take into
account the unique needs and circumstances of the child,
according to specified categories including gender. Finally,
Point 12 of the UN Rules requires that, “[j]uveniles detained
in facilities should be guaranteed the benefit of meaningful
activities and programmes which would serve to promote and
sustain their health and self-respect, to foster their sense of
responsibility and encourage those attitudes and skills that
will assist them in developing their potential as members of
society.”
Conclusion
While national law has moved toward recognizing the
dilemma posed by a growing number of girls entering a
juvenile justice system ill-equipped to address their needs,
the current voluntary standards have not been sufficient in
encouraging many jurisdictions to improve their services for
the female juvenile population. National lawmakers should
create greater incentives and provide stricter guidelines,
encouraging facilities to implement gender-specific
programming. Considering the overwhelming number of
traumatized and sexually abused girls who enter the juvenile
justice system, it is unconscionable to deprive them of their
liberty while also denying them access to counseling and
treatment.
State legislatures must evaluate the effectiveness of the ser-
vices provided to girls in state detention facilities and allo-
cate funding for the development of appropriate programs
and the hiring and training of staff. In addition, states should
move toward exercising the “least restrictive alternative” by
exploring community-based alternatives to incarceration.
Community-based alternatives can move the United States
away from a trend of over-incarceration of girls and closer
to meeting both nationally and internationally prescribed
goals of rehabilitation. 
*Ossai Miazad is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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